

講座四：宗教經驗純是心理作用嗎？

關啟文

A) 基本概念

(5 min.)

1. 心理分析學派 (Psychoanalysis): 肯定潛意識 (Subconscious) 或無意識 (Unconscious) 是人格的重要部份，從這角度解釋人類行為，及提出治療精神病之法 - Psychotherapy。
2. 弗洛伊德學派 (Freudian School): 心理分析學派的主要支派，建基在弗洛伊德 (Sigmund Freud) — 心理分析之父 — 的理論上；其他心理分析家包括容格 (Jung)、Adler 和 Frankl。
3. Wishful Thinking (Wish-fulfilment or illusion): 由內心強烈願望導致的思想和信念。
4. 情意結 (Complex): 一堆被壓抑而互相連繫的情緒、希望等。
5. Oedipal Complex: 根據弗洛伊德，男孩5、6歲時都會戀母及渴望與她發生關係 => 憎恨父親 (+ 尊敬愛慕) + 恐懼 (Castration anxiety) + 罪疚 => 混亂、矛盾、痛苦 => 壓抑在潛意識的衝突 (Repressed unconscious conflicts)，若不解決 => 神經失常 (Neurosis)。

Submerged portion of Iceberg

B) 弗洛伊德學派的挑戰

(15 min.)

1. 宗教只是源自人類欲望的幻想 (Religions as Illusion & Delusion)
 - a. 人類面對大自然的威嚇及文明的壓制 => 有許多需要 (needs)。
 - b. 這些需要引致我們很多深心的希冀 (wishes)。
 - c. 宗教信念正符合這些希冀。
 - d. 所以，宗教信念是起源於這些希冀，是心理投射 (Projection)。
 - e. 起源於希冀的信念都是不可信的。
 - f. 所以，宗教信念是不可信的，純是幻想 (Delusion)。

《註》 弗洛伊德是了解 illusion 與 delusion 的分別的，但很多他的跟從者卻常混淆二者。

2. 宗教是一種普遍的神經病 (Universal Obsessional Neurosis)
 - a. 宗教禮儀與 Obsessive-compulsive neurosis 的類比。
 - b. 我們都有 Oedipal Complex，這些被壓抑的情緒會尋求在意識中表達 (Repressed feelings will seek conscious expressions.)
 - c. 我們被壓抑對父親的情緒被投射到宇宙上，這導致我們有天父的信仰。
 - d. 在潛意識中我們有幼兒時無助感 (Infantile helplessness) 的回憶，生活的困難挑動這回憶，而使我們渴望有全能天父的保護，所以信仰只是回歸到幼稚心態 (Infantile regression) 而矣！

eg. 對小童吹斷生耳蠟燭！

3. 宗教的歷史起源

- a. 弗洛伊德的 Totem & Taboo, Moses & Monotheism: 父權族群，眾子殺父，事後內疚，崇拜圖騰 (Totem)，禁止亂倫 => 社會、道德及宗教的起源。(摩西也這樣被殺 => 猶太一神教之始。)
- b. 歷代萬世人類有這謀殺的潛意識回憶 => 宗教之普遍生命力。

Taboo

(40 min) C) 回應

有人提出投射說，你要問：「你點知？」「Freud 講嘅！」「Freud 又點知呢？」

(Difference: in academic circle, Freud 有勇氣而 N 缺 confidence ... 但 Freud 認真熟悉信徒不足！所以竟敢提出這假設而矣！)

1. 批判精神，不可盲信權威，或許弗洛伊德是天才，但他所說的不一
2. 承認有一些「信徒」的信仰純是源於希冀，但問題不在這裏 (聖經也有麥子稗子之分!)，問題是：「以上那種投射說是否一良好且普遍的說明？」(Is the projection theory a good, general explanation of religion?) 標準：

徒不足！所以竟敢提出這假設而矣！

但這假設需要 Test !!

① Freudian writing: 先舉一兩個 clinical cases, 然後 generalize 到所有信徒...

② Clinical case: 甚少訂實也有... 視覺 etc. 但這就可推到一切視覺經驗都有問題嗎？

舉例：為何 A, B, C 一會去打劫呢？說明王=他仍舊有手！

說明2：A是因失戀而暴有案...etc. → 打劫源於失戀...
(Too specific)

- a. 能解釋大部份信徒為何信 (及大部份非信徒為何不信)。
- b. 能解釋大部份信仰的內容。(信仰的事實 → selective 有可被任何 interpretation)
- c. 能提出合理的機制 (Psychological mechanism), 及證據去顯示宗教信仰正是源於這機制。eg. 強暴案 rate 5 出口米有 correlation → 入口米受

3. 宗教 = 幻想？

- a. (B1a) 可接受，但需要 ≠ 希望，其他可能：接納 (Acceptance)、放棄 (Resignation)，在無神的世界裏，為何不演化出較實事求是的人類？豈不更易生存？因為原始人迷信？為何迷信一有它用？困在火邊跳高有它用，為何不神下舞、66武、tran 打機 etc.
- b. (B1c) 也錯，信仰不全符合我們的願望：背十字架、捨己、愛人如己、追求完美、凡事有永恆後果...或許信徒有自虐狂?! The problem is: such kind of explanation can explain anything! (Q9)

Stories, Friend...

- c. (B1c) ≠ (B1d), 信念可符合願望，但源於經驗，例：沙漠中見到可樂，同理，就算我們希望宗教為真，但確實信以為真往往不容易，很多時要解決理性困難及有宗教經驗。majority of cases = wish → belief
- d. 說信仰是投射只是想當然矣，有何支持？投射的心理機制是存在的，但本身是不可觀測的，我們通常在以下情況才會將別人的信念視作投射：

Basic idea: 見到信仰或信徒有問題才出這招，而不是可隨便用。

- i. 我們知他的信念是錯或不合理的 => 需要說明。
- ii. 這信念與他深心所願相符 => 投射的假設。
- iii. 有些情況我們不確知這信念不合理，但以往經驗顯示他有易於投射的性格 (如自欺，自我中心，humourless, self-preoccupied => tense, reactive, 不能接受失敗、現實)，而 (ii) 也符合，那亦是一理由去說他投射，但不完全充足，因一慣於投射的人也有清醒之時。

- e. 所以，沒有理由相信大部份信徒的信念源於投射：

- i. 不應先假設信仰是錯或不可能。
- ii. 沒有證據支持大部份信徒都有易於投射的性格 (雖然有些是)。

專針的例子

- f. (B1e) 錯 - 起源謬誤 (Genetic Fallacy)! (Q6) 3 个女生的故事 again...
- g. 投射說假設那些希望是每人皆有的，為何有人不信？需要進一步指出 differentiating factor: 甚麼希望 (加其他因素) 是信徒 (及只有信徒) 擁有的呢？求保護、求永生、求公平：這些建議都不合格。

very threatening... & secularism 衝突 (Dyer 的例子: near-death exp.)

- h. 為何無神論不可是 illusion? 很多人都希望上帝不存在....
- i. 其實人類的強烈宗教渴求在無神的世界裏是難解的，宗教不單是用來滿足其他欲望，它更是人類心靈的基本渴求之一：人尋求超越界、神聖界及自我的身份及意義，從進化的角度來看，這些都是多餘的，那為何這宗教的動物 (homo religiosus) 會存在？有神論的世界觀正好可說明。(Q7)

* Argument from Desire

小結：投射說違反了以上 (2) 的所有標準，若無神論已被證為真，我們或可接受，不然，這不構成對信仰的獨立挑戰。

①、② 唔啱，③ projection 不是 independent 可觀測 - 試驗的機制，用這解釋 paranoiac upon negative evaluation of the belief or the believer...

4. 宗教 = 神經病？

- a. (B2a) 的類比不成立。obvious rational exp. of relig. ritual.
- b. (B2b) 不可觀測，已先假設了弗洛伊德的理論，但這理論可靠嗎？
 - i. 人類學的反證據：Malinowski 對 Trobriand Islanders 的研究 (Q2)。
 - ii. Popper 的挑戰：不可證偽 => 假科學！
 - iii. 弗洛伊德理論的基礎被嚴厲批評 (Q3-Q5)
 - iv. 其他心理分析家的挑戰 - 宗教是人類不可少的，且並非病態現象。

conclusion = Freudian 非自明真理，心理分析也非 rigorous science, unconscious 或信，也有 insight 甚至更全面的。

- Jung — God as Archetype (cf. Augustine)
- Frankl — Will to meaning

① Freud's having
② fixate on that type
③ projection of his disappointment

- c. 若每人皆有 Oedipal Complex，為何非信徒不投射？這假設了信徒的心理健康有問題 - 不普遍地真。Research data: AHRC's survey, Batson & Ventis 的結論...
- d. 無神論：投射對父親的憎恨 (e.g. Vitz's Epilogue on Freud himself)；不可知論：逃避 (avoidance)。
- e. 其實心理學解釋不一定與信仰衝突，為何神不可用我們的潛意識回憶，父親形象甚或幼兒無助感去開啟我們的心眼？為何神不可

另一例子：見心理分析家 -

早到 (anxiety), 遲到 (avoidance), 準時 (compulsive behaviour)

moral: 用 unconscious motives 去解，正解都係！要 independent support...

將對永生、救恩的渴求放在我們的心裏，好叫我們去尋求祂？這些心理因素並不影響宗教經驗的真實性。

例：在房中尋針 (Q8)

· 心理作用~~≠~~純是心理作用

· A Psychological explanation is often a partial explanation or a mediating cause.

5. 宗教起源

a. 與人類學證據衝突 (Q1)

b. 這回憶如何遺傳？

D) 宗教經驗的可信性

1. 如何對待我們的經驗？

a. 三種知識論進路

i. 先懷疑，直至不可再懷疑為止 (Descartes、Hume)。

ii. 先信任，直至有理由懷疑為止 (Reid, Wittgenstein(?), Swinburne)。

iii. 對感官經驗先信任、後懷疑，對其他經驗則先懷疑、後信任。

b. 評價：(i) 的進路會引至懷疑主義 (Scepticism)，且忽略了我
們經驗作為證據的力量；(iii) 的進路不合理，我們討
論的是先驗的知識論原則，為何要先假設唯有感官經驗
是可靠的呢？這是武斷的決定 (arbitrary decision)，
反映狹窄經驗主義者的偏見？所以 (ii) 的進路是最合
理而公平的。

2. 維護對神的經歷 (Experience of God)

a. 作為初步證據

i. 謹記：通常的假設是我們要用其他經驗去證明這些經歷，但
為何要接受這假設呢？有何理由去先驗地排斥宗教經歷，不
讓它有獨立的地位呢？應一律用 (ii) 的進路。

ii. 宗教經歷不單是一些感覺，它和感官經驗相似，將我們的心
靈指向外在的客觀存在。(Intentionality of experience)

iii. 宗教經歷不是私人的：它是由信仰群體共有的，由遠古至今，
每一社會都有不少人有這類經驗，cf. AHRC 的調查結果。

iv. 宗教經歷有其內在一致性，且有很多種不同的方法經歷神，
豐富異常，互相呼應：numinous experience, mystical
experience, personal encounter, conversion, experience
of God mediated by nature, conscience, beauty,
corporate experience of God, answered prayer,
miracle.... 每一經歷單獨看都可懷疑，但只要有一個經驗
不是虛幻，那神就存在！我們有理由相信由歷史開始至今上
千萬的宗教經驗全是幻覺嗎？這是可能的，但若非有充足的
理由支持，這種說法只是反映無神論者的先決立場而矣！

v. 另一原則：評論一種經驗時，應選其最優良的例子，評感官
經驗如是，評宗教經驗也應如此。有強烈宗教經驗的人中不
少有頂尖的智慧 (Aquinas、Pascal)、有高尚的人格和犧牲
的精神 (St. Francis of Assisi)，他們往往一生中都經
歷神、且不斷進深 (St. Teresa of Avila)，難道他們一生
都在自欺，他們的經驗全是幻覺？這有點武斷吧！(Q9)

vi. 宗教經驗與其他經驗的貫通 (coherence)：科學經驗、人際
經驗、道德經驗、美感經驗、自省經驗、實存經驗、頂峰
經驗。

vii. 宗教經驗有自然神學的支持。

b. 駁斥對宗教經驗的質疑。

c. 見證原則 (The Principle of Testimony)：重視別人的經驗是合
理的。

小結：宗教經驗是神存在的容觀證據，起碼以上證據顯示：信徒恰當
地信仰自己的宗教體驗是合理的。

E) 結語 (10 min.)

1. 我們常聽到：「宗教經驗只是心理作用而矣！」這是沒有根據的斷言，
我們應反問：「怎樣的心理？如何作用？有何證據？」

持己, but honest, pure in heart: 不是要 compensation, 成为偉大, 整天好慘, 好大犧牲咁!
(某些詩歌 = 「張我愛」... 过份鼓吹这种意义?)

2. 然而弗洛伊德的挑戰也應叫我們反省: 「會否某些信仰形態會導致信徒心理不平衡呢? Is 'faith' inhuman?
- 只有我們真的彰顯基督的生命——滿有恩典與真理——這才是最佳的回答。(Q10)

· Hans Kung: 'To be christian is to be radically human.'

(cf. Paul Ricoeur)

3. 四種誤用信仰的方法 (Jacobs, 32-35)

- a. 用來逃脫現實 (flight from reality)
- b. 提供虛假的安全感 (false security)
- c. 當作廉價消除罪惡刑罰的方法
- d. 製造一種自我中心及自戀的「聖潔」 (a 'holiness' that is self-centred & narcissistic)

→ quite, it can be a kind of self-preoccupation.

書目

- * Hans Kung, Freud & the Problem of God
(Best introductory book on the issue)
- Anthony Campolo, A Reasonable Faith
- Paul Vitz, Sigmund Freud's Christian Unconscious
- Hans Eysenck, Decline & Fall of the Freudian Empire
- Richard Holloway, Crossfire
- Michael Jacobs, ed., Faith or Fear?
- B. A. Farrell, The Standing of Psycho-analysis
- Nancy Tenfelds Clasby, 'Jungian Archetypes & the Transcendent Image' in Jacobson & Mitchell, ed., Existence of God
- Adolf Grunbaum, 'Psychoanalysis & Theism', Monist, Apr. 1987
- * Robert Banks, 'Religion as Projection: A Re-appraisal of Freud's Theory', Religious Studies, Dec 1973
- * William Alston, 'Psychological Explanation of Religious Belief' in John Hick, ed., Faith & the Philosophers
- Paul Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy
- * Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion (Chs. 11, 13- good, lucid discussion)
- * DWD Shaw, Dissuaders
(Good discussion of Freud, Marx & Durkheim)
- * Caroline Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience
(Ch. 8 contains incisive discussion of other psychological explanations of religious experience)

(Q1) Banks, 410

So far as Freud's anthropological observations are concerned, his interpretation of the origins of religion has been repeatedly criticised and entirely rejected in ethnological circles. Their findings may be briefly summarised as follows: (i) totemism is not to be found at the beginnings of religion and no one element, i.e., taboo or exogamy, can be regarded as an invariable characteristic of it; (ii) it is not universal and both totemism and taboo are less concrete phenomena than Freud had allowed; (iii) of the many hundred totemic tribes, only a few know a rite approximating the ceremonial killing and eating of the totem god; (iv) the pre-totemic peoples know nothing of cannibalism and parricide among them appears to be a psychological and ethical impossibility; (v) the form of pre-totemic family is neither general promiscuity nor group marriage and there is no evidence that either of these ever existed.¹ Freud's attitude to the growing evidence against his theory, some of which had already been published before the appearance of *Totem and Taboo*, is in this respect illuminating. In 1939, twenty-six years after its publication, he could write that though he was well aware of its unanimous rejection in ethnological circles, he continued to support it because it tied in with his psychoanalytic findings.

(Q3) Eysenck, 207-208

What cannot be doubted, I think, is that psychoanalysis is on the way down, that it has lost any academic credibility, and that as a method of treatment it is being used less widely.

What then, in conclusion, can we say of Freud and his place in history? He was, without doubt, a genius, not of science, but of propaganda, not of rigorous proof, but of persuasion, not of the design of experiments, but of literary art.

Psychoanalysis is at best a premature crystallization of spurious orthodoxies; at worst, a pseudo-scientific doctrine that has done untold harm to psychology and psychiatry alike, and that has been equally harmful to the hopes and aspirations of countless patients who trusted its siren call. The time has come to treat it as a historical curiosity, and to turn to the great task of building up a truly scientific psychology.

(Q2) Campolo, 81

Anthropologists such as Margaret Mead and Bronislaw Malinowski have shown that many of the psychosexual traits that Freud believed to be universal are actually specifically tied to Western cultures. For instance, the famous Oedipus complex was nowhere to be found when Mead made her famous study of the people of Samoa, or when Malinowski studied the Trobriand Islanders.

(Q4)

Farrell,
190

The impact of psychoanalysis on the West cannot be justified on the ground that it contains a body of reasonably secure or established knowledge about human nature. Chapter 8 makes it only too painfully evident that analysis does not contain any such body of knowledge. In so far as the popular view assumes that it does contain such a body of knowledge, it is mistaken, and this view of the matter and Auden's 'whole climate of opinion' are riddled with delusion. If we try to justify the popular view by relying on 'Freud's great discoveries', we will fail because there are no discoveries strong enough to do the job. If we try to justify it by claiming that Freud has made us see human nature in an entirely new and fresh way, we will obviously fail again. For, though this claim about Freud's historical influence may well be correct, his new and fresh way of making us 'see' human nature is not self-guaranteeing. It has to be established. Nor can the impact of psychoanalysis on our culture be justified on the ground that it uses a method of exploration into human nature, which is of known or established validity. On the contrary, the results of this exploration are infected with an unknown degree of uncertainty. Nor yet again can the impact of psychoanalysis be justified on the purely pragmatic ground that it works - that it is an effective method of treatment. Chapter 9 makes it evident that the case for the effectiveness of analysis is too weak to serve as a good foundation on which to base the Freudian revolution.

(Q5)

Grunbaum,
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But what are the actual empirical credentials of Freud's sexual etiology of obsessional neurosis, and of his oedipal ontogeny of theism? In the context of the conjugal family, this oedipal plot calls for not only an erotic love-hate triangle prior to the age of six, but also a redemptive denouement of the guilt-laden parricidal wish by projective exaltation of the father into God. It is a clear moral of my recent book⁴¹ that, far from having good empirical support, at best these obsessional and oedipal hypotheses have yet to be adequately tested, even prior to their use in a psychology of religion. A fortiori, the psychoanalytic ontogeny of theism still lacks evidential warrant.

(Q6) Alston, 143

If we define a neurosis in terms of underlying causal factors, as is often done, e.g., in terms of the amount of conflict which is unconscious and therefore not resolvable by rational deliberation, then in order to show that a belief can be dismissed from serious consideration on the grounds that it arises out of a neurosis we would need a supplementary argument to the effect that any belief so produced is unlikely to be correct. But we know too little about the effects of unconscious processes to have any confidence in any such principle. Moreover, if we widen the sphere to cover kinds of disguised resolutions of unconscious conflicts other than beliefs, we can think of many such cases which would not be classified as harmful or undesirable—e.g. (to take a couple of favourite textbook examples) the resolution of unconscious conflict over aggression by developing skill as a surgeon or resolution of unconscious conflict over love of one's mother by specializing in painting madonnas.

Therefore it seems that if we are to draw negatively evaluative implications from connection with a neurosis we shall have to build some negative evaluations into the concept of neurosis. And I believe that this is usually what is done. Included in the commonly-used working criteria for calling a state a neurosis is, the requirement that this state have the effect of hampering the individual in his 'adjustments to the environment' or in his attempts to achieve his aims in life.

(Q7) Clardy, 88

In the case of the parallelism between the structure of the psyche and the religious paradigm the question is why these particular patterns emerged. Where did this development code come from? Man did not make up his own psyche.

If the psyche were structured in some straightforward way which simply extended the animal instinct to flee from danger, to reproduce when possible, to acquire food, the origin of the psyche in survival needs would be evident. But the psyche is an endlessly convoluted form, full of phenomena which have little obvious relation to survival. The positive function of religion in primitive societies is often pointed to as the reason for its development. Religious beliefs, it is said, comforted man, stabilized society and offered primitive explanations for mysterious phenomena. Since the contrary may also be asserted with equal force (religion frightened man, caused stagnation in society and spread superstitious misinformation), the argument for the utility of religion fails to explain the extraordinary energy which has poured into the evolution of the human psyche and its various theophanies. Far from having developed along clean, functional lines, the psyche seems a singularly extravagant anomaly.

the discovery of natural factors in the origin of a religious phenomenon does not logically rule out the possibility of a God who created, sustains and works through those natural factors themselves. Freud does not seem to have seen this point clearly. Next, the conjunction of religious beliefs with wishes, as wishes, would only result in a denial of them if there was other evidence demonstrating conclusively that the wish had no correspondence with reality. This, as his definition and discussion of illusion shows, Freud was quite willing to acknowledge. In any case, belief in doctrines that originally were the product of wishful thinking need not always remain on this level or always be prompted in this manner. Finally, Freud's conviction that the infantile tendency of the wish counted against the likelihood of its possessing a counterpart in reality, only begins to carry plausibility if this assessment of its character can be sustained. Even so, the conclusion as to the unreality of what is wished for does not necessarily follow. Allowing, for the purposes of the argument, that religious ideas

are infantile in character and that human fatherhood is a predominant element in their formulation, does it necessarily follow that this is all there is to be said? From several points of view it is doubtful whether this is the case. In the first place, it could be argued that though a child comes to entertain and visualise the idea of God in a form patterned upon images unconsciously derived from its relations with the father, it is inevitable his understanding of God should develop in this way. It is only possible to absorb and interpret new experiences by assimilating them to previous experiences. With regard to the idea of God, it would be difficult for the unconscious to find a more pertinent source of assistance than those reflections of the child-father relationship deposited, via repression according to Freud, within it.¹ The close correlation of the two sets of ideas is just what one would expect.

This would be even more the case if a further possibility is given consideration. It is conceivable, logically as well as theologically, that the twin notions of fatherhood and sonship are, in fact, elemental and that the significance they possess for us in childhood ultimately derives from nothing less than the constitutive principle of the universe. If that were the case, in religion 'we are not deifying human parenthood and projecting on to Reality fantasies created out of the transient emotions of children not yet able to reason about the facts of their experience'. We should speak of a "paternisation" of God rather than a "divinisation" of parents, and see in filial adoration the prototype of religious feelings and the origin of theological dogmas'.¹ This would mean that whereas a description of the psychological processes involved may account for the colour, shape and movement, as it were, of religious experience, it does not account for its real substance. However much that substance may have been inadequately perceived through the images with which it is unconsciously clothed, or inappropriately endowed with characteristics relevant to earthly fatherhood but not to its divine counterpart, it cannot simply be reduced to the other. Its core remains intact.

(Q8)

Banks

417-418

(Q9) Holloway

Projection of any sort seems to point to some level of self-absorption or narcissism in the subject. There is much of that at work among religious people, and for many of them faith is sometimes practised in a neurotic way. However, the religious type at its purest and highest does not seem to have these characteristics. The saint, the clear spirit, is characterized usually by innocence and purity of heart.

(105-106)

We ought to pause, therefore, before accepting the dismissal of religious faith as a mere projection, because of the persistent testimony of the pure in heart that they see God, and not just some version of themselves in their encounter with the mystery that besets them. Spiritual traditions of any seriousness help us to cut away false projections and untrue images. They call us to die to the self that seeks comfort in illusion. Indeed, the pure in heart, the souls that do not get in their own way when they are contemplating the mystery of life, usually infuriate those whose religion is an elaborate device for unconsciously avoiding a true encounter with reality. This was certainly the effect Jesus had upon his contemporaries. In him we see a trust in God that is so radical and absolute that it reverses and transvalues normal human standards, and this is the result, not of personal psychological complexity, but of purity, clarity of heart, a transparency that meant that what he saw and talked about was what was really there, whether it was in the hearts and minds of those who confronted him, or was the transcendent reality he communed with in the heart of the mystery of prayer. For those who try to follow him in some way, even if it is from a great way off - like Peter lurking back in the crowd that witnessed his passion - Jesus is the true interpreter of God, the one in whom divine reality is really made known, truly manifests itself.

Holloway

And the paradox is that people who live like this, the people we call saints or holy ones, do not have the brooding complexity and pain that characterizes the insane, the tortured ones who have split off from reality. Nor do they possess the insecurities and anxieties, the greeds and longings of the neurotic majority who are trapped into conforming to the going standards of the time. On the contrary, the closer to God they become, the more committed they are to the service of that absolute whose existence is so trenchantly denied by some of the cleverest people alive, the more simple and joyful and straightforward they become. If it is only the pure in heart who see God, the converse also seems to be true, that those who really see God become pure in heart, are characterized by a sort of limpidity that is in total contrast to the murky and cluttered lives of hesitant and complex half-believers or unbelievers. The insanity of total surrender to God seems to lead to the highest types of humanity, clear and straight in their own natures, and willing and laughter-filled in their service of others. The paradox of sanctity is the strongest contradiction of the claim that religion is an unhealthy projection; but there is power in the accusation, nevertheless, because there are so few saints and so many compromised Christians. (109-110)

(Q10)

Jacobs,

37

People have said that Christianity was a revolution which was never born. The church always has been and remains the institution most capable of thwarting all revolutions. It has been rapidly integrated into patrimonial society, based on the family, property and inheritance. It became a hierarchical institution, with its own structures and its temporal interests to defend. Even worse, however, it completely changed the meaning of its initial message. It established a morality founded not on love but on fear of death and the last judgement. It based its education on the crucifixion and not on the resurrection: Christ was crucified because of his love and his liberal behaviour, all qualities which do not accord well with the needs of a church and an organization. But he was raised and by the same token acknowledged to be Son of God.

Crucifixion and resurrection: the real problem lies there. The death to self favoured by Christian morality is not submission to the other person; it is not submission to a legalistic superego inculcating feelings of guilt. Its meaning is quite different: to die to oneself is to lose the primitive narcissism which makes someone incapable of any real social life and any deep relationship with others. It is to pass from being an object, subject to prohibitions and taboos, to being a responsible, autonomous subject, capable of loving oneself and others deeply. There, it seems to me, is the real sense of resurrection which makes us free men, sons of God.