

ACUCA CONFERENCE PAPER PROPOSAL

6-7 December 1999, Fu Jen Catholic University

Theme:

International Conference on the 21st Century Christian Higher Education in Multi-Cultural Asian Societies

Sub-topics:

- 1) How can our Christian institutions develop their Christian character in effective and morally acceptable ways in the face of some negative influences, like secularization and cultural pluralism?
- 2) How can we develop interaction among Asian Christian universities and colleges for their mutual enrichment?

Proposed Title:

The Idea of Christian Scholarship: Integration of Faith and Learning in an Age of Pluralism

Presenter:

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Abstract:

One of the main purposes of a higher education institution is to produce high-quality scholarship. However, it has always been a difficult question for a Christian institution: "Is there such a thing as distinctively Christian scholarship?" There seems to be a kind of dilemma here. On the one hand, the affirmation of the idea of Christian scholarship may sound partisan, sectarian and intolerant to the mainstream academic circle. It is especially so because the academy is heavily influenced by the process of secularization and the ideology of pluralism. On the other hand, if we deny the idea of Christian scholarship, say, by insisting that good Christian scholarship is *just* good scholarship, then the distinctive character of a Christian institution seems to be lost.

This paper argues for the significance of faith-informed scholarship and defends it against objections. First, I introduce the mini-renaissance of Christian scholarship in the West, e.g. in the field of philosophy, and the discussions of the idea of Christian scholarship there. Second, I point out that one major objection to faith-informed scholarship is that it would not be objective and scientific. I then argue that as we move into the 21st century, the demise of foundationalist epistemology in the

postmodern setting makes the above objection obsolete. Third, I defend the claim that the existence of Christian scholarship is not antithetical to the spirit of a pluralistic society; it is rather a manifestation of diversity, especially in our Asian contexts, where Christianity is never an established religion. Fourth, I outline the main features of Christian scholarship and argue for its significance in our secular society.

It is obvious that the paper is directly concerned with the first sub-topic of the conference. It is also relevant to the second sub-topic. For fruitful interaction between Christian institutions, we need some common task that is felt to be important for our existence. In the end of the paper, I suggest that the development of Christian scholarship is an urgent task that calls for collective efforts by all Asian Christian universities. I also propose some means to realize this end. These collective efforts will certainly promote mutually enriching interactions between the Christian universities.

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The Idea of Christian Scholarship:

Integration of Faith and Learning in an Age of Pluralism

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INTRODUCTION

In the West, even just a century ago, Christianity was a leading force in higher education. But today at most it is tolerated as a peripheral enterprise, and often it is simply excluded. In Asia, there are also a small number of Christian (Protestant or Catholic) universities. However, it is not easy to maintain the Christian identity in an age of rampant secularism and pluralism. To do that, it is incumbent upon the Christian higher education institutions to produce high-quality scholarship. However, it has always been a difficult question for a Christian institution: "Is there such a thing as distinctively Christian scholarship?" There seems to be a kind of dilemma here. On the one hand, the affirmation of the idea of Christian scholarship may sound partisan, sectarian and intolerant to the mainstream academic circle. It is especially so because the academy is heavily influenced by the process of secularization and the ideology of pluralism. On the other hand, if we deny the idea of Christian scholarship, say, by insisting that good Christian scholarship is just good scholarship, then the distinctive character of a Christian institution seems to be lost. In this paper, I would like to explore the meaning, significance and viability of faith-informed scholarship. It is encouraging to note that in recent decades, there is a mini-renaissance of Christian scholarship in the West, e.g., in the field of philosophy, and science-religion dialogue. Many Christian scholars join in the discussions of the idea of Christian scholarship, and there are voices who contend for the significance of Christian scholarship, not just for Christian institutions, but also for the academy as a whole. One significant voice is George Marsden, the Francis A. McAnaney Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame. I will draw upon his work heavily in this paper. This idea has provoked some criticisms, and I will look at them as well. First of all, let us briefly review the process of the secularization of the academy in the West, and try to identify the major forces underlying this process.

(by Marsden)
1997

THE SECULARIZATION OF THE ACADEMY

Let us first look at the secularization of the academy in America.¹ When the Duke University

¹ Marsden (1994) has provided a detailed historical account of this process. A summary of that can be found in Marsden (1992). Most chapters in Marsden and Longfield (1992) are also relevant.

was established in 1924, it was stated clearly that the "aims of Duke University are to assert a faith in the eternal union of knowledge and religion set forth in the teachings and character of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." However, in the 1960s, the University gave up required religion courses for the undergraduates. Similar examples can be multiplied. In 1924, chapel attendance was required at the University of North Carolina, Yale, and Princeton. In 1939, around one-fourth of *state* universities still held at least voluntary chapel services, and most routinely subsidized campus religious activities. Most leading private universities included divinity schools. In the 1950s, college-educated persons were in general more active in religious groups. "In the United States, for instance, until 1870 the great majority of colleges had as their presidents clergymen who taught senior courses on Moral Philosophy that involved Christian apologetics and applications of Christian principles to many areas of life and thought" (Marsden 1992, p.4). A century ago, most educators were clergymen, and it would be difficult to distinguish the role of a professor from that of a minister. It can be said that "until recently Protestants and their heirs were overwhelmingly dominant in setting the standards for American universities" (Marsden 1992, p.10).

Nowadays, the situation is radically different. We have witnessed the "transformation from an era when organized Christianity and explicitly Christian ideas had a major role in the leading institutions of higher education to an era when they have almost none" (Marsden 1992, p.5). Although there are huge numbers of Protestants in the United States, they support almost no distinctively Christian program in higher education other than theological seminaries. There are still more than a hundred evangelical colleges; yet "their total number of students is about the same as that of two state universities. There is almost no Protestant graduate education outside of seminaries" (Marsden, p.10). How did this transformation happen, and why?

1992
The transformation was achieved in several stages. The first stage is the collapse of clerically controlled classicist education by the end of the nineteenth century. By that time, a technological world began to emerge. To compete in the modern world, there was a need to produce scholars with different kinds of specialization. So the old classicism seemed too amateurish, and there was an imperative to establish new universities and graduate education programs. The disestablishment of the church was felt to be a necessary condition for the emergence of higher education as a separate profession. This process of professionalization was not inherently anti-Christian. In fact, it was often promoted in the name of a more open Christianity that takes cultural responsibilities seriously because the liberal Protestants think that scientific and technological activities themselves are simply Christian. (Especially after 1890, the moral justification for professionalization blended with the rising Social Gospel.) During this process, the scientific method was treated as sacred, and academic freedom became the unifying ideal of higher education. Theology no longer served as the thread that

unified higher education. If it still had a place in it, it was treated just as one specialty among many others. Moreover, "the dominance of these technological forces have expanded the areas of higher education where Christianity would have no substantive impact and where many Americans see it as having almost no relevance" (Marsden 1992, p.21).²

During this stage, traditionalist Protestantism was regarded as intellectually reactionary, and was routed by liberal Protestantism, which remained dominant in higher education from 1870s to 1960s. At that time, liberal Protestantism made ally with a growing ideological secularism, and achieved some kind of dominant cultural consensus. However, although vestiges of the old informal religious establishment persisted throughout the era following the Second World War, it was manifested typically in increasingly vague and peripheral ways in order to pacify its secular allies. "Only when the resulting Christian-liberal consensus was challenged by the realities of twentieth-century pluralism did the religious dimensions fade. With the 1960s attacks on liberalism itself, organized religious liberalism virtually abandoned the field of higher education" (Marsden 1992, p.5). In the heat of new cultural pressures since the 1960s, most of what was substantial in such religion quickly evaporated, often almost without a trace, and seldom with so much as a protest (Marsden 1992, p.11). This was the second stage of secularization. How can we account for this rapid change since the 1960s?

There are many forces working here. First of all, the concern for academic freedom and the ideal of detached impartiality had been reinforced by a Comtean positivism and the use of statistical technique. Since 1960s, this more aggressive pluralistic secularism provides no check at all on the tendency of the universities to fragment into technical specialties (Marsden 1992, p.21). While this has caused some educators to have concern about the inculcation of values in the context of universities, this is mainly done through courses on English literature, Western civilization, humanities, great books, and so on. We can see from the Harvard report of 1945, *General Education in a Free Society*, and the 1947 report of the President's Commission on Higher Education for Democracy that "a pragmatic stance that assumes current democratic values" has become the norm (Marsden 1992, p.24). This is couched in largely secular terms instead of religious terms. The rise of mass education has also made the triumph of the pragmatic approach almost inevitable (mm 1992, p.24). Moreover, "[c]hanging national mores and opportunities presented by coeducation provided immediately compelling motives for one to ignore religious issues during one's college years" (Marsden 1992, pp.24-25).

² Another factor was that the money from the industry and the government to support technical research and development became increasingly important for the higher education institutions. Marsden notes that in fact the universities were serving the technical economy, and still under outside control!

During the whole process of secularization of the academy, cultural pluralism has always been an important factor. Since the universities are public institutions, a concern for justice has exerted enormous pressure on the church-founded universities to become non-sectarian. So they gradually moved away from substantive connections with their church or religious heritages, dropped courses with explicit theological or biblical reference³, and laicized their boards, faculties and administrations. They also abandoned formal creedal test for the faculty. (In comparison, Catholic schools and smaller sectarian colleges could retain exclusivist aspects longer.) The "liberal Protestantism's two-level approach to truth allowed the sciences and the professions to define what was actually taught at universities, to which higher religious and moral truths could be added as an option" (Marsden 1992, p.27). However, this strategy had two problems. First, faith and learning were not really integrated, and the faith elements became more and more peripheral. Second, as the distinctive elements of Christianity were gradually abandoned, the Christianity which still remained in the universities was defined more or less as a moral outlook.

In order to search for a unified national culture, American Protestantism tried to absorb the cultural diversity, and it seemed at that time that only an objective scientific method could unite all. "By the twentieth century, as traditional Christianity appeared too divisive to be an acceptable public religion and liberal Christianity began to drift into a dotage of moralism, scientific method emerged as the senior partner in the integrative project of establishing a unified national culture" (Marsden 1992, p.31).

Perhaps one may point to the emergence of religious studies as a sign of counter-secularization of the academy: "The number of religion departments was increasing so dramatically that by the 1970s almost every university had one" (Marsden 1992, p.35). However, Marsden thinks that the religion programs are not in fact a countervailing force to the secularization of universities (1992, p.37). It is because the rationale for them now had largely shifted from the view of religion as one of the humanities with a moral purpose to its being considered one of the social sciences. The trend of pluralism has caused the non-Christian religions to be emphasized. Moreover, the ideal of academic impartiality has been interpreted in such a way that teachers of religion with religious faith will be suspected to have bias. So even the teachers in religious studies programs tend to adopt a non-religious stance.

The universities in Britain followed similar paths of secularization. "In 1850 at Oxford all heads of house except one were in the Anglican ministry; virtually all tutors were clergymen;

³ For example, Harvard University's original motto, *Veritas pro Christo et ecclesia*, has later become *Veritas* only!

and about 80 percent of undergraduates were intending to pursue a clerical career" (Bebbington 1992, p.259). In Cambridge, the undergraduates had to study Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*. In King's College, London, there was required attendance at daily chapel and a weekly divinity lecture. In Scotland, most universities were dominated by the Church of Scotland. On the whole, "universities ... were Christian institutions, supplying the churches with their clergy. Higher education was bound up with religion" (Bebbington 1992, p.260).⁴

Religious pluralism was again a powerful impetus towards secularization. As a result of the protest of excluded religious groups, religion was seen as a divisive issue for higher education. So there was a pressure towards non-sectarianism on entirely pragmatic grounds. In Britain, secularization was rarely the result of proclaimed hostility to religion. Secularism as an ideology played only a minor role and the diffuse assumption that religious claims had been discredited had a larger influence. Other factors also included the increasingly important role of the state as the paymaster, and the development of science and technology. However, as a whole, the secularization of the academy in Britain is not as complete as that in the States. The lingering presence of religion in British universities is still noticeable. For example, most or perhaps all major universities have chaplaincy centres and college services. When I was in Oxford, I was surprised to discover that they would say grace (in Latin!) even before informal dinners.

CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION

As a result of secularization, Christian higher education in the West faces a problem of marginalization. As Gill says, "During the twentieth century, theological and religious perspectives have been marginalized, if not utterly excluded, in much of our college and university education. In my otherwise outstanding experience as an undergraduate in history at the University of California at Berkeley in the sixties, it puzzled and troubled me that my courses in the late Roman Empire, in the Protestant Reformation, and in African-American history overlooked the importance of theological ideas and religious communities" (1997, p.2). Even when dealing with questions of values, students are often asked to bracket out religious convictions. So the message in the classroom is that "religion is really a private affair and that when it comes to the important things of life, such as understanding the world, our culture, other cultures, how you should make a living- matters that have to do with "the real world"- one should make no reference to beliefs that in other contexts are said to be ultimate" (Marsden 1997, p.105).

religions

Marsden also observes, "Apart from voluntary religious groups, religion in most universities

⁴ A notable exception was the University College, London, which was founded by agnostics.

is about as important as the baseball team" (1992, p.33). There is also a bias against the hearing of religious perspectives, e.g., the existence of a created moral order, in the university classroom. Often religion is not represented in the curriculum at all. The underlying assumption of the dominant university culture is that explicit religious perspectives are unscientific. So religious scholars have to keep quiet in order to be accepted. The separation of faith and learning is taken for granted. The idea of Christian scholarship sounds nonsensical to many people.

The situation in Asia is not completely the same as that in the West. For example, aggressively anti-religious secularism is not very strong in Asia. However, as far as higher education is concerned, Christianity is more or less under the same pressures because the higher education in Asia basically follows the Western model. Moreover, the faculty in Asian universities and colleges have usually been trained in the West, and most of them have imbibed the dominant university culture in the West. Although not many non-religious intellectuals openly attack religious beliefs, most of them are indifferent to or even contemptuous of religion. When they teach or do research, they would rarely consider the viability of religious perspectives. So the end result is the same in Asian higher education: religion is marginalized.

One may guess the situation is different for the Christian universities. I think we cannot be too optimistic about that. Even Christian universities are under great pressures to conform to the dominant model. Especially when those Christian universities receive public funding, they are often forced to embark on the path of secularization. As the proportion of non-Christian faculty becomes greater and greater, it is virtually impossible to promote Christian scholarship at the university level. In fact most of the Christian faculty have also been trained in the West, and they have absorbed similar values. Many of them just don't care about the promotion of Christian scholarship, or the integration of faith and learning. In the long run, the Christian identity of those institutions is likely to disappear apart from the prayers of the chaplain in some formal ceremonies.

THE BASIC IDEA OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP

For many Christian intellectuals, the current situation of higher education is far from satisfactory. Several of them, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, boldly propose the idea that Christian scholarship should be governed by its own control beliefs, and it is a legitimate and academically respectable thing to do that. To understand the background of this proposal, we need to learn of the mini-renaissance of evangelical scholarship in recent decades, especially in the field of philosophy.

"The past two decades have seen the field of philosophy of religion flourish. This may surprise anyone familiar with the field's status as recently as just some forty years ago. At mid-century philosophical circles dismissed philosophy of religion as an uninteresting area of which Hume and Kant had already had the last say. Logical positivism and existentialism, both descended from Hume and Kant via vastly different lineages, were the prevailing movements of the time and neither held any tolerance for rational argument concerning the existence and nature of God... But things change. Today philosophy of religion is a vibrant and exciting area of philosophical research with four academic journals and at least three professional societies devoted to the field. One of these, the Society of Christian Philosophers with over a thousand members, is the largest single-interest group in the American Philosophical Association. Indeed, many of the most influential philosophers at work today publish regularly on topics in this particular field" (Jordan and Howard -Snyder, p.ix). Many leading philosophers of religion, e.g., Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, are Christians with strong convictions. By producing high quality, respectable scholarly work, they show that religious conviction can be combined with philosophical sophistication.

One novel development of contemporary philosophy of religion is the movement of Reformed epistemology. Instead of reconciling with the dominant epistemological paradigm by providing proofs of God or evidences for Christianity, it challenges the assumption that Christians cannot begin with the belief in God as the fundamental presupposition of their noetic structure. (The more technical way of saying this is that belief in God is a properly basic belief.) For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff, a leader in this movement, argues that this assumption is based on foundationalism, an epistemology which insists that every belief should be based on a set of foundational beliefs which are either indubitable or acceptable to all rational persons. Wolterstorff uses detailed philosophical analysis to argue that foundationalism is mistaken. So it is unfair to insist that Christians have to justify their faith with reference to an allegedly neutral set of foundational beliefs simply because such a neutral set does not exist. Instead, the "Christian scholar ought to allow the belief-content of his authentic Christian commitment to function as control within his devising and weighing of theories. For he like everyone else ought to seek consistency, wholeness, and integrity in the body of his beliefs and commitments... his fundamental commitment to following Christ ought to be decisively ultimate in his life" (Wolterstorff 1984, p.76). Another leader of the movement is Alvin Plantinga. In a series of essay and three volumes on warrant, he provides a sustained critique of foundationalism and constructs a new epistemology called "proper functionalism" which leaves room for the proper basicity of belief in God and specifically Christian beliefs. He also applies this approach to the discipline of philosophy. In his "Advice to Christian Philosophers," he argues that Christian philosophers should not confine their

work to using commonly shared beliefs to support the faith. Rather, they should be more bold in advancing distinctively Christian positions and perspectives.

Marsden was one member of a team of scholars who came together to study Reformed epistemology.⁵ His proposal of the revitalization of Christian scholarship can be seen as the application of Reformed epistemology in the context of higher education. His basic idea is that "mainstream American higher education should be more open to explicit discussion of the relationship of religious faith to learning. Scholars who have religious faith should be reflecting on the intellectual implications of that faith and bringing those reflections into the mainstream of intellectual life" (Marsden 1997, pp.3-4). He emphasizes that religious commitments are basic to identities. He asks, "Why are there in mainstream academia almost no identifiable Christian schools of thought to compare with various Marxist, feminist, gay, post-modern, African-American, conservative, or liberal schools of thought? If one compares, for example, the number of Marxists in America with the number of Christians, the disparity in their visibility in mainstream academia is truly remarkable" (Marsden 1997, p.6). While he is by no means advocating a simplistic fundamentalism, he deems Christian scholarship an alternative to the hollow secularism prevalent in current universities. In other words, he challenges the dogma that the only respectable place for religion in academy is as an object of study. He believes scholarship informed by faith, if responsibly worked out, as much deserves a hearing in the university classroom as scholarship informed by secular or other religious perspectives.

Since Marsden's proposal is antithetical to the deeply ingrained assumption of the separation of faith and learning, it has been heavily criticized. Marsden tries to reply to these criticisms in his book *The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship*. I'll discuss the objections and replies below.

IS CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP NECESSARILY SUBJECTIVE AND PARTIAL?

First, there is the problem of objectivity and neutrality. One major objection to faith-informed scholarship is that it would not be objective and scientific. A Christian scholar advocating Christian scholarship cannot remain neutral. So his scholarship within and without the classroom will not be impartial. In response, we need to point out that as we are moving into the 21st century, the demise of foundationalist epistemology in the postmodern setting is normally taken for granted by scholars. In particular, pre-theoretical influences on humanities and social science are almost universally acknowledged. However, it is interesting to note that while this should make the above objection obsolete, in fact many people would suddenly become foundationalists when they come to matters of religion! As Marsden points out,

⁵ Their articles were collected in Plantinga and Wolterstorff (1983).

despite attacks on Enlightenment, "when the subject of religion is mentioned, the categories of Enlightenment skepticism seem to be miraculously resuscitated" (1997, p.26). Moreover, the rule that academic beliefs must be empirically based is in fact "not applied consistently to other undemonstrable beliefs that lay prominent roles in the secular society" (1997, p.28). For example, the belief in equality and the wrongness of infanticide, and the concern for the poor and the handicapped are treated as inviolable moral commitments rather than empirically grounded theories. While belief in creator is dismissed as irrelevant in the university classroom because it is undemonstrable, "the equally undemonstrable supposition that there is no creator is routinely accepted in academic inquiry" (Marsden 1997, p.28). For example, it is the backbone of Marxist and naturalistic paradigms, which are prevalent in social science, philosophy and so on. This is simply inconsistent. It is also unfair because "it unduly favors scholarship based on purely naturalistic presuppositions" and it is ironic that "this rule is not itself a conclusion of empirical investigation" (Marsden 1997, p.29)!⁶

As a matter of fact, non-Christian professors will also have their own presuppositions, which shape their scholarship. As Reichenbach notes, "professing is perspectival, worldviewish. The professor who is the barren midwife will never be able to profess; empty jugs can pour no water. In recognizing this, professors are freed from the unnecessary burden of trying to prove that they possess the illusory property of objectivity. They are also freed from the delusion that students are incapable of evaluating for themselves what is professed, without being overwhelmed by the power or position of the instructor" (1997, p.16).

However, while "[p]rofessors bring to their professions, both within and outside the classroom, their own noetic structure," the "hope is that what is unique about the perspectives of the professors is that they have conscientiously reflected on them and subjected them to scrutiny by themselves and their professional and academic community" (Reichenbach 1997, p.14). The point is that while Christian scholarship need not subject to the latest intellectual fad, the faith of a Christian scholar must be subject to learning. It is unwarranted to suggest that a religious identity will automatically make a scholar partial, and hence disqualify him or her from teaching, say, religion. Marsden asks, "What if someone suggested that no feminist should teach the history of women, or no gay person teach gay studies, or no political liberal should teach American political history?"

So while Christian scholarship is perspectival, it cannot afford to ignore the basic rules of the academic game. Reichenbach thinks that all scholarly viewpoints should be testable by reason and experience, and open to examination, analysis and discussion. In the academy, "open, civil debate must in principle rule, no matter how false or despicable one thinks the opposing

⁶ This last point echoes one of Plantinga's major criticisms of foundationalism: it is self-referentially incoherent.

viewpoint" (Reichenbach 1997, p.20). Christian scholars need to affirm truth, but they should do it undogmatically. Similarly, Marsden recognizes the problem: "how to balance the advocacy implicit in all scholarship with academic standards that are scientific or "reasonable" in the sense of being accessible to people from many different ideological camps" (1997, p.45). He acknowledges some shared basic standards of evidence and argument. So some "public knowledge" is possible, and "explicitly Christian convictions do not very often have substantial impact on the techniques used in academic detective work, which make up the bulk of the technical, scientific side of academic inquiry" (1997, p.47). Christian scholars also need to use those standards, and it is no good to argue on the basis of a special revelation or authority others don't share (Marsden 1997, p.48). So how should Christian scholarship be put forward?

There are several possibilities. First, some "viewpoints might be introduced into the mainstream academy for religious reasons, but defended with arguments and evidence that are publicly accessible... having a religious *source* does not automatically exclude one's views from acceptance in the academy so long as one argues for them on other, more widely accessible, grounds" (Marsden 1997, p.48). But nowadays prejudices against some religious positions exist. For example, the fundamentalist dispensationist's view of history will be less accepted than a Jewish view, and concerning homosexuality, the position of the liberal Episcopalian psychologist will certainly have advantage over that of the conservative Episcopalian psychologist, though both may be derived from religion! (Marsden 1997, p.49). Furthermore, Christian scholars can also "reflect on the implications of such [special] revelations within the bounds of the mainstream academy by talking about them conditionally" (Marsden 1997, p.52).

Some people may in principle accept that all scholarships are perspectival but they would contend that naturalistic assumptions should be given precedence over religious assumptions. It is because while the former can unite people, the latter will be divisive. However, Marsden rightly points out that "attempts to extend the empirical model of natural science to other fields of academic inquiry have failed to unite people on the larger questions concerning society and human relationships. Contemporary academia is just as divided... On the larger questions of life, empirical science is not competent to provide definitive answers. The idea that reliance on empirical scientific models will eliminate sectarianism is simply false" (1997, p.28). Still others may suggest an operative rule in the pragmatic academy to exclude all background beliefs or authorities that are not shared by most academics. However, "such rule would ... exclude far too many beliefs" (Marsden 1997, p.49), e.g., minority opinions on moral issues. "Before they became widespread, beliefs such as that slavery is wrong or that women and men are equal would have been ruled out because they were based on authority of

moral principles that were self-evident only to some people" (Marsden 1997, p.49).

So Marsden concludes that there should be "room for explicit Christian points of view (just as there are explicit Marxist or feminist views) for those who will play by the other rules proper to the diverse academy" (1997, p.52). This is not intended to promote additional ideological dogmatism and preaching that would cut off intellectual exchange. Marsden points out that "there is a danger with any strongly held position and it is always a struggle to keep some partisans within the bounds of fair discourse and argument. Recognizing that, I am simply proposing that the same rules apply to all. No matter what commitments one brings into one's academic work, one would have to argue for one's scholarly interpretations on the same sort of publicly accessible grounds that are widely accepted in the academy" (Marsden 1997, p.52).

31 日本の Prof. Morimoto

THE PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSIVISM AND PLURALISM

Some people criticize Marsden's proposal because they believe it will lead to the assertion of the superiority of Christianity and the exclusion of other perspectives. Marsden ably replies, "This is something of a red herring: everyone believes his or her views to be superior to alternative views. Perhaps, if we lived at a time when Christian views were legally or virtually established and other views were excluded, such objections would carry some force. In our time, ... that is hardly the issue. As long as we are talking about voluntary religious expressions, a Christian point of view is no more exclusive of other views or other faiths than any other point of view" (1997, p.10). So Marsden is not proposing a Christian establishment in academy. As an historian, he is sensitive to the problems with Christian establishment: "Until the late nineteenth century traditional Christianity was often used to limit academic inquiry. At more conservative religious schools traditional Christianity was often part of a defensive posture and was sometimes taught in heavy-handed ways" (1997, p.23). However, he deems the current marginalization of religion an over-reaction. In view of current virtual establishment of non-belief, there is simply no realistic hope that Christian scholarship will exclude other views. All Marsden is proposing is that responsible Christian scholarship should be given a proper place and a hearing in the academy.

He also accepts the fact of pluralism (of first principles), and believes that "as far as public policy is concerned, some version of pragmatic pluralism is indeed the only live option" (1997, p.38). However, he believes that consistently applied pluralism should include rather than exclude Christians. If we insist that the voice of every minority group should be heard in the academy, isn't it strange that many Christian constituents are not represented at all? So the existence of Christian scholarship is not antithetical to the spirit of a pluralistic society; it

is rather a manifestation of diversity, especially in our Asian contexts, where Christianity is never an established religion. "A diversity or multiculturalism that excludes Christianity ... is a hypocritical contradiction in terms" (Clouse 1997, p.115). If, for the sake of pluralism, Western religion courses should place emphasis on Asian religions, then the Asian religion courses should place emphasis on non-Asian religions such as Christianity for the same reason.

Excluding Christianity is not only inconsistent, it is also unfair. In our current setting, many scholars, e.g., gay and feminist ones, take strong stands on ethical issues. "Academic struggles take place in a cultural context of bitter contests over moral standards for public policy. So the issues cannot be resolved simply by tolerance and learning to get along better. The fact is that many contenders on the various sides of such debates are imperialistic in the sense of wanting to set the moral standards for all of society" (Marsden 1997, pp.32-33). If we say that pluralism would justify the silencing of Christian voices, we effectively "endorse the concerted imperialism of groups who wish to exclude traditional Christianity from public expression. Simple equity suggests that all sides deserve some protection" (Marsden 1997, p.33). To address further the worries about Christian imperialism, Marsden gives several points in response. First, "the vast majority of religious conservatives do not speak in this imperialistic way and in fact are committed to playing the basic rules of liberal policy when acting in the public domain" (1997, p.33). Second, "while it is important to guard against religious extremists gaining power over the pluralistic public domain, the threat is not essentially different from that of secular or political extremists taking over" (1997, p.34). Marsden comments on some secularists: "Despite their rhetoric of pluralism and their deconstructionist ideologies, many in practice act as though they held Enlightenment-like self-evident universal moral principles... they want to eliminate from academia those who do not broadly share their outlook" (1992, p.38). Third, "Christians are far too hopelessly divided for that [a Christian taking over] to be possible" (1997, p.34). Perhaps the imperialism of secularism is more dangerous! Fourth, "Peoples of diverse cultures are welcomed into respectable academic culture, but only on the condition that they leave the religious dimensions of their cultures at the door" (1997, p.35). This is imposing dreary uniformity and not promoting diversity! A religiously diverse culture will be an intellectually richer culture.

It is also arguable that Christianity can provide a better basis for the respect for diversity than radical versions of relativism and multiculturalism, which are often invoked in support of pluralism. Clouse points out that "[t]he prejudice against Christianity on the part of the multiculturalists is unfortunate because of their reliance on Western Christian ethical ideals of human dignity. In fact, by denying their intellectual and moral debt to the Western outlook they fail to fulfill their goal to respect and cherish what is valuable in all cultural groups"

(1997, pp.103-104). Relativism as a position which denies the universality of values also sits ill with the concern for the marginalized: "A relativistic pluralism cannot account for the sense that previously marginalized viewpoints have something that *ought* to be given due consideration. Relativism can only perpetuate their marginalization by continuing to deny them the *right* to make truth-claims" (Mouw 1997, p.122; italics mine). On the whole, a Christian respect for diversity can avoid the traps of tribalism and the neglect of the truth questions: "A diversity that blesses separatism or a competitive tribalism is a grave disservice to our strife-torn world. A diversity that fails to explore common ground or that timidly avoids questions of truth and ethics is an educational and social failure" (Clouse 1997, p.115).

So "in a pluralistic society we have little choice but to accept pragmatic standards in public life" but there is "no pragmatic basis for marginalizing all supernaturalist religious viewpoints a priori" (Marsden 1997, p.46). It is "perfectly possible ... to hold ... an Augustinian view that faith in God, rather than faith in self or material contingency, should shape one's essential vision of reality and yet to support the rules of liberal society as a God-given means for accomplishing some limited but immensely valuable goals" (Marsden 1997, p.45). So pragmatism is simply a relatively good method for dealing peacefully and with equity among diverse peoples. However, Marsden cautions against the absolutization of these pragmatic values: "The tendency of twentieth-century liberal culture has been to absolutize the pragmatic method. The absolute ... is that which promotes civil discourse. Virtues such as tolerance, openness, dialogue, agnosticism, mutuality, equal opportunity, scientific method, truth-seeking, charity, and love of beauty might be on a list of "the top ten" commandments" (Marsden 1997, p.46).

The above discussions are especially important in our Asian context. Many people think that in view of the plurality of Asian religions, Christians should not emphasize their own identity to eschew the trap of "exclusivism". However, does it also mean that Confucianists or Buddhists should not emphasize their identities as well? If not, why is the rule applied to Christianity alone? If we truly cherish diversity, we should encourage the existence of a distinctly Christian identity and scholarship. Of course, the same applies to the Confucian and Buddhist identities, and so on. It should also be pointed out that identity does not exclude dialogue. The development of Christian scholarship should go hand in hand with inter-religious dialogue. Christianity has a lot to learn from other traditions.

THE SHAPE OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP

Some do not query the legitimacy of a Christian perspective, but they (including some Christian scholars) may wonder what difference it could possibly make. Marsden concedes

that the Christian faith will have less influence on technical dimensions of scholarship or individual "facts", but it will have more influences on theory and interpretations, and the overall pattern and meaning of "facts" (1997, p.61). (His favourite illustration is the duck-rabbit figure.) The influence will also vary with topics, and is more significant concerning topics that "have the most to do with interpretation and with the larger significance and meaning of humans in relation to each other and the universe" (Marsden 1997, p.63). However, there will be influences even on largely technical disciplines. For example, the faith will be a factor in motivating a scholar to do her work well, will help determine the applications one sees for his scholarship, will help shape a sub-field, a specialty, or the questions one asks about one's work, and will affect how one see the wider implications of the work. In a way, as Robert Wuthnow says, Christianity sacralizes the intellectual life.

Marsden is careful to maintain that faith-informed scholarship is not the same as the Christian view having divine sanction (1997, p.67). There is no one Christian view on any subject (1997, p.69). "What all the schools of Christian scholarship do have in common ... is just the sort of thing Robert Wuthnow describes as fundamental in the relationship of a tradition to scholarship- they are asking some common questions that have a direct relationship to their faith" (1997, p.70). However, the diffuseness of Christian influences should not be confused with the absence of influences. Not all aspects of Christian scholarship are distinguishable from other types of scholarship. "One would hardly argue that virtually any question or scholarly agenda that might be proposed by a Marxist scholar could be posed by non-Marxist that therefore a distinctive Marxism was not shaping the scholarship. For Christianity the same applies" (1997, p.69). Suppose one argues that since every individual feature of a beautiful face could be found in some face or other, no face is distinctively beautiful. It is clearly fallacious. It is the overall pattern that counts. The same applies for a worldview. So Marsden concludes: "many particular aspects of a Christian scholar's work will look much like the work of a colleague with another nontheistic set of commitments. Yet the relative importance that we assign to things, the central questions we ask about them, and the assumptions that lie behind these questions will all vary according to what makes up our larger picture of reality" (1997, p.82). What is this larger picture of reality for Christians?

Christian scholars are advised not to invoke the God-of-the-gaps but they should not believe that empirically demonstrable explanations are the only ones. It implies an openness to the transcendent realm, and a rejection of naturalistic reductionism. Christian scholars should also challenge the assumption of the transcendent self. For the Christians, "the heart of human sinfulness is the illusion that we can be our own gods, a law unto ourselves, creating and controlling our own reality" (1997, pp.78-79). So they should be "critical of viewpoints, especially prevalent in the arts and literature, that emphasize human freedom and creativity as

supreme values. Although of immense worth, these human gifts will reach their highest expression when exercised within a sense of the limits of the individual in relationship to the community, the created order, and ultimately to God... current philosophies which absolutize the self pose a real danger of fostering lawlessness" (1997, p.79). While the Christian hope saves the Christian scholars from the trap of cynicism, they should also provide a critique of the mass culture which celebrates sensuality and self-indulgence. It is also possible to spell out in more details the implications of the doctrines of creation, incarnation, sin and so on for scholarship. However, limitation of space forbids that. Please refer to Marsden (1997, ch.5).

CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP AND HOLISTIC EDUCATION

I also believe Christian scholarship should commit to holistic education. In particular, three aspects need to be emphasized. First, a Christian scholar should uphold holistic higher education ideals. "A distinctively Christian approach to liberal education would have at its foundation a conception of our common human task, which begins with the concept of *imago Dei* and works its way through such concepts as covenant and kingdom to the crucial concept of *imitatio Christi*" (Westphal 1997, p.29). Aristotle has discussed 3 intellectual virtues: 1) technical know-how; 2) moral know-how; 3) contemplation. "Liberal education ... will be the holistic project that includes all three of Aristotle's intellectual virtues. Liberal education will include vocational education..., but the vocational component will be different by virtue of its place in a larger whole... just as integral will be the development of theoretical and moral reason... The acquisition of marketable skills will be integrated with serious reflection about what goals we ought to seek, including their relative priority, and about what means are legitimate in their pursuit" (Westphal 1997, p.36). In the Christian context, academic excellence means:

- 1) aspires to cultivate all three virtues;
- 2) does a good job of developing each; and
- 3) integrates them into a balanced and harmonious whole

From the Christian standpoint, we should caution against the danger that vocationally oriented programs can become the tail that wags the educational dog. In fact, in our society, "theories that guide our quest for ever-higher levels of productivity and profitability show little sign of the constraints of morality or the context of contemplation" (Westphal 1997, p.39). The primacy accorded to instrumental reason and the demands of economy will only result in a less than fully human, and dehumanizing society. "Perhaps we serve best when we do not automatically identify what the age demands with what the age needs" (Westphal 1997, p.40).

Second, a Christian scholar should not divorce research and teaching. How should a Christian

professor convey the results of his Christian scholarship to the students then? According to Reichenbach (1997, pp.21-25), a Christian professor should do the following:

- 1) put the issues squarely on the table;
- 2) stake out a thesis regarding the issue;
- 3) provide students with reasons for thinking that what is professed is true or probably true;
- 4) engage those who think differently, but neither to construct straw persons to be easily vanquished nor to demean or belittle opposing views or the persons holding them;
- 5) do all these out of a sense of humility brought on by the recognition of our extreme finitude;
- 6) challenge the students with the profession.

As a result, learners are “enabled to come to an open-minded, fair, reasoned, judicious, and carefully qualified position of their own” (Reichenbach 1997, p.25).

Third, a Christian scholar should attempt to integrate spirituality and scholarship. “If evangelical anti-intellectualism is to be avoided, there must be a recognition of the need for a genuine spirituality to be grounded in careful thinking. And if evangelical intellectual arrogance is to be avoided as well, there must also be a recognition of the need for a healthy scholarship to be rooted in a spirituality that cultivates the fruit of the Spirit” (Mouw 1997, p.118). Spirituality in fact has effects on one’s scholarship. For example, “[h]umility translates in very concrete ways into a spirit of critical self-examination that is necessary for a healthy intellectual quest. Faith builds the trust and reliance on others that is foundational to a community of scholars. Self-denial and love of other people- and love of one’s subject matter- reinforce the patterns of scholarly teaching and dialogue” (Mouw 1997, pp.119-120). These virtues provide the cement that gives cohesiveness to the academic enterprise. Mouw further delineates other elements of academic spirituality:

- 1) Respect for the academic, not using it only as a means to evangelism.
- 2) An “invitational” spirit: “to invite others to consider possibilities that they may have previously ruled out because of their own secularist or anti-religious biases... eliminating the kinds of prejudices, misconceptions, and stereotypes that often serve as stumbling blocks to conversion” (p.125); but no place for conversionist tactics.
- 3) Love of reality (that we are studying) as God’s creation.
- 4) Healthy pluralism: “draw on their own uniquely communal resources for demonstrating to their secular colleagues that it is possible to foster a healthy pluralism without slipping into relativism. A self-conscious awareness of their actual involvement in the worldwide, multicultural body of Christ can provide them with access to a cross-cultural conversation intensified by a degree of spiritual bonding that is seldom available to secular scholars” (p.126).
- 5) Hopeful humility: a “patience that is capable of tolerating complexities and living with

seemingly unconnected particularities without giving in to despair or cynicism" (p.127).

Gasque emphasizes that just requirement of doctrinal adherence without spiritual formation and Christ-centred worship is hollow. If the value of the spiritual formation in the educational mission is not adequately realized, we cannot effectively resist secularization.

MODELS OF INTEGRATION

No doubt Christian scholarship should put an emphasis on the integration of faith and learning. This task has a Christological basis, i.e., it is based on the recognition of the fact that in Christ all things hold together (Col. 1:17). Its goal is to discover this ultimate coherence and unity of truth proleptically. However, what is genuine integration and how should we integrate? These questions need further discussions.

First of all, we need to beware of the danger of pseudo-integration, which uses "the data from the disciplines for illustrative, devotional, or apologetic purposes. They *use* the disciplines, but are quite irrelevant to *doing* the disciplines. Nothing in these examples requires the person to be inside the assumptions, concerns, and methodologies of the disciplines mentioned. It is the wholly external setting of Christian and disciplinary ideas side by side that makes these into superficial or negative instances of integration" (Wolfe 1987, p.4). An example of pseudo-integration: "2 and 2 is always 4 ... and God is always the same; you can depend on Him." In contrast, "[g]enuine integration occurs when an assumption or concern can be shown to be internally shared by (integral to) both the Judaeo-Christian vision and an academic discipline" (Wolfe 1987, p.5; italics in original).

Following Nelson (1987, p.317), I distinguish three approaches to integration:

- 1) compatibilist: locate and integrate compatible elements indigenous both to the scholar's Christian faith and to his discipline;
- 2) reconstructionist: emphasizing the radical demands of the Christian faith, and seeing no substantial common ground between a discipline and the faith, it attempts a complete reconstruction of the discipline;
- 3) transformationalist: recognizing a measure of common ground but also trying to do justice to the sovereign and comprehensive claims of Christ, it seeks a disciplinary transformation.

I think a certain kind of integrative pluralism is unavoidable. Since the nature of each discipline is to some sense unique and its current state of development is affected by historical contingencies, the suitable approach to integration should vary with the discipline. For example, the compatibilist model may be suitably applied to the integration of chemistry or

physical geography with the faith. A reconstructionist model may be applicable to contemporary philosophy of mind, which is dominated by naturalistic assumptions. A transformationalist model seems best for the integration of psychology and faith. It is because within psychology, there are both more empirically grounded "facts" and higher level assumptions about humanity. To a large extent, a Christian scholar can accept the former but he must critically evaluate the latter lest reductionistic assumptions will masquerade as facts. So the discussion of the models in general may help to clarify issues but they cannot replace the detailed exploration of the best approach in each discipline. That is also why the success of Christian scholarship depends on long-term and collective efforts of a community of dedicated Christian scholars. For examples of integration of faith and learning in various disciplines, see the discussions in Heie and Wolfe.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP

Having outlined the main features of Christian scholarship, I now want to argue for its significance in our secular society. First, we should note that there are all kinds of problems with our current universities. Marsden says, "Contemporary university culture is hollow at its core" (1997, p.3). It lacks a spiritual centre. "Knowledge today is oriented increasingly toward the practical; at the same time, in most fields the vast increases in information render our expertise more fragmentary and detached from the larger issues of life" (Marsden 1997, p.3). Many scholars are contented to dwell on the technical, and they try to avoid questions about the first principles. Others are in their own way dogmatic moralists but their principles often undermine moral norms.

Academics saw the disestablishment of religion in higher education as the triumph of science, free inquiry, and liberalism. However, since 1960s, these ideals have come under attack. The "critics have shown that the old Western liberalism, with its twin ideals of value-free scientific inquiry and the promotion of individual freedom, was based on a myth. In other words, the very principles that provided the moral rationale for shaping modern higher education have proved untenable. Inquiry is not generally value-free, and there is no reason to continue to insist on supposedly value-free scientific methods as the model for all inquiry. Moreover, liberal universities were never as free from political, commercial, class, and gender interests as their rhetoric implied" (Marsden 1992, pp.6-7). "In the name of equality and the rights of women and minorities, this faction questions all beliefs as mere social constructions, challenges what is left of the old consensus ideology, attacks the Western-oriented canon, and repudiates many conventional ethical assumptions" (Marsden 1992, p.33). The demolition of old ideals has left a moral vacuum which is filled by rhetoric and politics. "So the modern university, which liberated itself from religious dogmas in order to become a haven for free

inquiry, is in danger of becoming largely an arena for political debate based on appeals to dogmatic authority. At the same time, no authority is widely recognized" (Marsden 1992, p.6).

In this context, the revival of Christian scholarship may prove to be significant for the renewal of the university culture. First, political power and intellectual orthodoxy are healthiest not when unopposed but when in tension with opposing perspectives. Exactly because religious commitments are marginalized, they can provide an important check on centralized power. So one function of Christian scholarship is "a critique of current scholarly assumptions" (Marsden 1997, p.72), e.g., the myth of liberal neutrality. Christian scholars should point out that modernist presumption of common reason is itself a constituent of a particular tradition, i.e., Enlightenment. The pretense to neutrality on the part of liberal tolerance is more like a strategem with a secular bias. The self-appointed referee turns out to be a contestant in disguise. For example, American history is dominated by secular accounts and tends to ignore the role of religion. Christian scholars are in a position to repair the situation.

The other major function of Christian scholarship is to uphold its holistic education ideals. This should alleviate the problems of contemporary universities. First of all, excessive emphasis on research has suffocated the desire to teach in many cases. A Christian commitment to teaching may help to address this problem. Second, the problem of spiritual aridity of the American university is increasingly recognized.⁷ Hall thinks that "as they confront their own identity crises, late adolescents experience a haunting nostalgia for the deep, inner, unselfish, altruistic part of themselves that has been neglected in the course of their development" (1997, p.49). The "*story* of a God who loved humans enough to die for them can penetrate youth's personalities and enable them to commit themselves to lives of sacrifice and unselfishness" (Hall 1997, p.49). So religion has a central role in meeting the goal of inculcating moral and spiritual values. "Such values should exceed the "functional ideals" of adjustment and achievement within a society. They transcend the materialistic egotism that tends to dominate the motivation of the average late adolescent" (Hall 1997, p.52). This function of religion can't be replaced by "Values Seminars." These seminars "will remain tame, inconclusive, and ineffective unless the discussion is grounded in the kind of transcendent reality about which religion speaks... Until and unless students acknowledge that the moral call is at the essential core of their personhood, they will tend to relativize their own obligations and leave justice concerns to others who seem to prefer such involvements" (Hall 1997, p.52).

⁷ For example, Smith (1990) addresses this problem and calls for a renewed recognition and appreciation of both the "Classical Christian Consciousness" and the "Secular Democratic Consciousness."

Spiritual aridity is also a problem for the academics. The importance of academic spirituality has been emphasized by a recent work of Mark Schwehn (1993). He argues that we need academic virtues which are formerly based on religion (e.g., communal worship in academy). He concludes that "those religious academic institutions in which worship and the spiritual disciplines can still be openly encouraged must keep the connections alive, resisting the secularizing forces that have already caused widespread academic disintegration" (Schwehn 1993, p.120). In this aspect, religiously based academic institutions certainly have an important role to play. If scholars are significantly shaped by spiritual commitments, the combination of intellect and character will be more convincing. Virtues like respect for others and humility will also facilitate fruitful academic exchange and collaboration.

After discussing the goals of liberal arts education, Westphal concludes, "The only alternative to this, other than giving up all pretense of liberal education and becoming purely vocational, is for colleges and universities to bite the hand that feeds them by challenging the materialistic, instrumental assumptions so close to the heart of corporate and consumer America. If the Christian faith cannot provide the moral and intellectual resources for making such a challenge creatively and compassionately, I am not sure where else to look. It may be that the religious context is the only one in which the tradition of liberal arts education can survive in today's world" (1997, p.40). If Christian institutions have such a unique role to play, it is really important for them to implement a philosophy of education in keeping with their Christian identities.

The pressures on Christian higher education are largely fueled by the ideology of Enlightenment. It is important to look beyond Enlightenment as the postmodern era is coming. This will give us stronger motivation to resist those pressures. "While enlightened liberal culture has made great accomplishments that ought to be preserved, it can no longer be said to be obvious, or even probable, that simply more of the same is the key to social improvement. No longer is it so easy to assume that if we just become more open and more tolerant we will all get along better. Openness and diversity ... have their own orthodoxies and their own intolerance. Academic culture, where such ideals have been most in vogue, does not offer coherent ideals that can serve as a beacon of enlightenment in a world of prejudice... Church-related liberal arts colleges are finding out that, having preserved some of their traditional ways, they are now offering more of what people are looking for in higher education and hence are ahead of the game. So we have to recognize that our old assumptions about what constitutes progress have changed- or should change" (Marsden 1997, p.110).

THE WAY AHEAD

I agree with Marsden that there is "room to reconstruct a place for religious perspectives as one option in higher education... If it is true that religiously held perspectives are on the face of it no less responsible intellectually than are non-religious ones, then it should no longer be true that religiously oriented institutions should be expected to abandon their religious perspectives in order to gain academic respectability. Rather, one might expect that a truly pluralistic society would encourage faith-oriented higher learning as well as the various secular alternatives" (1997, p.7).

In fact, after reviewing the grievances of contemporary higher education in the West, several scholars have recently called for a recovery of the emphasis on religion. For example, Malony argues that "education in the liberal arts tradition... should require that as much attention be given to religion as to science and to the humanities in its curriculum. An adequate overview of culture demands it" (1997, pp.41-42). Hall proposes to establish a separate Religion Division in the liberal arts curriculum. He also suggests courses on religion and Dialogue Seminars such as science/religion seminars and humanities/religion seminars with a view to reconcile science and religion, and to discover a way to transcend the cultural relativism of humanities. Gill also proposes that courses in the Bible and World Religions ought to become general education requirements, and "religious perspectives ought to be given their due, whenever appropriate, in courses in history, literature, philosophy..." (1997, p.7). If you look at these proposals, you will realize that some of them may have already been realized in the Asian Christian universities. It seems to me that we have to cherish the opportunities we have.

For fruitful interaction between Christian institutions, we need some common task that is felt to be important for our existence. The development of Christian scholarship is an urgent task that calls for collective efforts by all Asian Christian universities. "Isolated individuals in university culture can make impressive efforts here and there, but unless their voices are concerted, they will be lost in the general cacophony of the contemporary academy" (Marsden 1997, p.101). I propose some possible means to realize this end below:

- 1) We need a collective Christian scholarly enterprise in which Christian intellectuals operate with a clear sense of what a Christian worldview is all about. So a high priority should be placed on the formation of organizations of Christians representing existing institutions who band together for the purpose of regular scholarly exchange in the context of a variety of academic disciplines. Examples in the West include the Society of Christian Philosophers, the Conference on Faith and History, the American Scientific Affiliation, the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals (ISAE), and Conference on Christianity and Literature. Similar institutions in Asia seem to be largely non-existing.

- 2) A series of seminars aimed at faculty development can be held. One goal is to raise consciousness about the possibility of Christian scholarship and its compatibility with academic excellence. Other faculty development programs should try to cultivate the Christian academic consciousness of faculty who are really seriously religious, e.g., programs sponsored by the Lilly Endowment which enable Christian scholars to spend a year together working as a community of Christian scholars; summer institute program for graduate students and new faculty.
- 3) We can establish research centers like the Tyndale House where the Christian faculty could come together for sabbatical research and annual conferences. This is especially important for young scholars.
- 4) international exchange program and faculty exchanges among Christian colleges
- 5) graduate-level interdisciplinary theological degree designed to provide the foundation required for integration of faith and learning
- 6) publicize existing opportunities for centers for research
- 7) cooperative grants office
- 8) e-mail networks
- 9) research institutes that encourage first-rate scholarship in a particular area, and integration; can bring together some top-rank scholars who could also be affiliated with a major university; offer post-graduate fellowships, and invite visiting scholars.
- 10) Need to educate the public, including the political public, on the legitimacy of intellectual inquiry that goes beyond the usual secular limits. We need to "encourage diversity *among* institutions as well as diversity *within* institutions" (Marsden 1997, p.106).
- 11) To endow chairs for extra faculty positions for scholars who would both be excellent in their field and provide leadership in the area of faith and learning.
- 12) important to mobilize students and give them a vision of what Christian scholarship might mean because they are the hope for the next generation

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