鄭安然（事工總監）

·       “The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (Page 5)
「憲法沒有提及墮胎，任何憲法的條款也沒有保障這種權利，包括羅案及凱西案捍衛者現在倚賴的第十四修正案中的正當法律程序條款」（頁5）

·       “It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.”  (Page 6)
「現在是時候聽從憲法，把墮胎議題交回給人民選出來的代表」（頁6）

·       “The Constitution makes no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim that it protects such a right must show that the right is somehow implicit in the constitutional text. Roe, however, was remarkably loose in its treatment of the constitutional text. It held that the abortion right, which is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right to privacy, which is also not mentioned.” (Page 14)  
「憲法沒有明確提及獲得墮胎的權利，因此那些聲稱它保障這種權利的人必須證明這權利大致上在憲法文本內暗示。然而，羅案明顯在看待憲法文本的功夫上放鬆了，它認為墮胎權即使沒有在憲法上提及，也是隱私權的一部份，而隱私權也沒有在憲法被提及。」（頁14）

·       “When we engage in that inquiry in the present case, the clear answer is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the right to an abortion.” (Page 14)  
「當我們處理今次案件的問題時，清楚的答案是第十四修正案沒有保護墮胎的權利。」（頁14）

·       “The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973.” (Page 25)
「一個不能躲避的結論是，墮胎權利不是深深植根於國家的歷史和傳統。相反，由普通法最早期的日子至1973年，連綿不絕的歷史是透過刑事懲處的苦楚禁止墮胎」（頁14）

·       “Not only are respondents and their amici unable to show that a constitutional right to abortion was established when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but they have found no support for the existence of an abortion right that predates the latter part of the 20th century—no state constitutional provision, no statute, no judicial decision, no learned treatise.” (Page 26)
「不單答辯人及法庭之友都不能顯示墮胎憲法權在第十四修正案採納時已被建立，他們也找不到墮胎權存在的支持，沒有州憲法條文、沒有法例、沒有司法決定、沒有學術專著，一直至20世紀晚期。」（頁26）

·       “While individuals are certainly free to think and to say what they wish about “existence,” “meaning,” the “universe,” and “the mystery of human life,” they are not always free to act in accordance with those thoughts. License to act on the basis of such beliefs may correspond to one of the many understandings of “liberty,” but it is certainly not “ordered liberty.” (Page 30-31)
·       「當然，每個人都有自由思考及表達他們對「存在」、「意義」、「宇宙」及「人類生命奧秘」的盼望，但他們不是常常有自由根據這些想法去行動。建基於這些信念而行動的許可，相當於我們其中一種對自由的理解，但這肯定不是「有序自由」。」（頁30-31)

·       “What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abortion destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an “unborn human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion is “a unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. They are therefore inapposite. They do not support the right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token, our conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.” (Page 32)  
「墮胎權與羅案及凱西案所倚賴及承認的權利是截然不同，兩宗案都坦承墮胎破壞這些判決所講的「潛在生命」，今次案件的法律把生命當作「未出生的人類」（參Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (墮胎是「本質上不同」); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (墮胎是「獨特行為」) 沒有其他判決被羅案及凱西案所引述是有關墮胎引起的重要道德問題。它們因此是不合適，它們沒有支持獲得墮胎的權利。同一道理，我們認為憲法沒有給予這種權利的結論，也沒有破壞它們。」（頁32)

·       “In addition, when one of our constitutional decisions goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the bad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erroneous constitutional decision can be fixed by amending the Constitution, but our Constitution is notoriously hard to amend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Therefore, in appropriate circumstances we must be willing to reconsider and, if necessary, overrule constitutional decisions. Some of our most important constitutional decisions have overruled prior precedents.” (Page 40)
「此外，當我們其中一個憲法判決走歪，國家通常被錯誤判決卡住，除非我們改正自己的失誤。錯誤的憲法判決可以透過修改憲法紏正，但我們的憲法都是惡名昭彰地難以修改。因此，在合適的情況下，我們必須願意重新考慮及必要時推翻憲法判決。我們也有過一些最重要的憲法判決是推翻之前的案例。」（頁40）

“In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality of their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they imposed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas of the law, and the absence of concrete reliance.”  (Page 43)  
·       「在這案中，有五個重份量的因素支持推翻羅案及凱西案：它們錯誤的本質、論據的質素、這些規則加諸在國家的「可行性」、對法律其他範疇的破壞後果及缺乏具體倚賴。」（頁43）

·       “Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging.” (Page 44)  
「羅案驚人地錯誤及有深遠破壞力」（頁44）
·       “Roe was on a collision course with the Constitution from the day it was decided, Casey perpetuated its errors, and those errors do not concern some arcane corner of the law of little importance to the American people. Rather, wielding nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to address a question of profound moral and social importance that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.” (Page 44)  
「自羅案判決的那天開始，它與憲法的衝突就勢必出現。凱西案延續了它的錯誤。這些錯誤不是牽涉不太重要的法律及小數美國人，而是揮舞著「赤裸裸的司法權力」（Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissenting)）法院篡奪權力去處理一個有深遠道德及社會重要的問題，然而憲法毫不含糊地指出這些問題應交還給人民處理。」（頁44）

·       “Together, Roe and Casey represent an error that cannot be allowed to stand.”  (Page 44)  
「羅案及凱西案同樣反映一個錯誤，因此站不住腳。」（頁44）
·       “Roe was incorrectly decided, but that decision was more than just wrong. It stood on exceptionally weak grounds.” (Page 45)  
「羅案是錯誤判決，但這判決不單是錯，更是站在非常弱的基礎上」（頁45）
·       “Roe found that the Constitution implicitly conferred a right to obtain an abortion, but it failed to ground its decision in text, history, or precedent.” (Page 45)  
·       「羅案指出憲法隱約地賦予墮胎權，但未能把這判決建基於文本、歷史或案例。」(頁 45)  

·       “Roe’s reasoning quickly drew scathing scholarly criticism, even from supporters of broad access to abortion.” (Page 46)  
·       「羅案的理據很快引來大量學術界批評，甚至是支持廣泛獲得墮胎的人士。」（頁46）
·       “But even if one takes the view that “personhood” begins when a certain attribute or combination of attributes is acquired, it is very hard to see why viability should mark the point where “personhood” begins. The most obvious problem with any such argument is that viability is heavily dependent on factors that have nothing to do with the characteristics of a fetus. One is the state of neonatal care at a particular point in time. Due to the development of new equipment and improved practices, the viability line has changed over the years.”  (Pages 51-52)  
「即使有人認為「人性」是在得到某些特性或特性組合時開始，也十分難看到為何宮外獨立生存能力是人性的開始點。這個理據最明顯的問題是宮外獨立生存能力很大程度倚賴與胎兒無關的特徵。這是新生兒護理狀態的某一個特定時間點。由於新器材的發展和做法的改良，宮外獨立生存能力的界線每一年都在改變。」（頁51-52）

·       “In addition, as the Court once explained, viability is not really a hard-and-fast line.” (Page 53)  
「除此之外，法院曾解釋，宮外獨立生存能力不是真正不可改變的線。」（頁53）

·       “The viability line, which Casey termed Roe’s central rule, makes no sense, and it is telling that other countries almost uniformly eschew such a line.” (Page 53)  
「宮外獨立生存能力的界線（凱西案形容羅案的主要規則）是沒有道理，而重要的是其他國家幾乎一致地避開這條界線。」

·       “All in all, Roe’s reasoning was exceedingly weak, and academic commentators, including those who agreed with the decision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their criticism.”  (Pages 53-54)  
·       「總括來說，羅案的理據極弱。包括那些同意這判決作為政策的一些學界評審員也毫不留情批評。」（頁53-54）

·       “The Court’s abortion cases have diluted the strict standard for facial constitutional challenges.60 They have ignored the Court’s third-party standing doctrine.61 They have disregarded standard res judicata principles.62 They have flouted the ordinary rules on the severability of unconstitutional provisions,63 as well as the rule that statutes should be read where possible to avoid unconstitutionality.64 And they have distorted First Amendment doctrines.” (Pages 63)  
·       「法院的墮胎判案淡化了挑戰憲法（facial constitutional challenges）的嚴格標準，他們忽略了法院第三者立場信條（third-party standing doctrine），他們也沒有理會既判力原則（res judicata principles）有關違憲條文的可分割性，他們藐視了原有規定，也藐視了法律應以不違憲的可能去理解的規則。他們也扭曲了第一修正案的條文。」（頁63）

·       “Our decision returns the issue of abortion to those legislative bodies, and it allows women on both sides of the abortion issue to seek to affect the legislative process by influencing public opinion, lobbying legislators, voting, and running for office. Women are not without electoral or political power. It is noteworthy that the percentage of women who register to vote and cast ballots is consistently higher than the percentage of men who do so.”  (Pages 65)  
·       「我們的決定把墮胎議題交還給立法機構，容許在墮胎議題上持有不同立場的女性透過影響公眾意見、遊說立法者、投票及參選影響立法過程。女性不是沒有投票或政治權力。值得注意的是，登記投票及投票的女性百份比一直比男性高。」（頁65）

·       “And to ensure that our decision is not misunderstood or mischaracterized, we emphasize that our decision concerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion. (Page 66)  
「為免我們的判決不會被誤解和錯誤描述，我們強調我們的判決關注墮胎的憲法權，而非其他權利。這判詞不應被理解為質疑其他與墮胎無關的案例。」（頁66）

·       “But we cannot exceed the scope of our authority under the Constitution, and we cannot allow our decisions to be affected by any extraneous influences such as concern about the public’s reaction to our work.” (Page 67)
「但在憲法下，我們不能超越我們權力的範圍，我們也不能容許我們的決定被外界影響，例如擔心公眾對我們工作的反應。」（頁67）

·       “This Court cannot bring about the permanent resolution of a rancorous national controversy simply by dictating a settlement and telling the people to move on. Whatever influence the Court may have on public attitudes must stem from the strength of our opinions, not an attempt to exercise “raw judicial power.” (Page 68-69)
「法院不能單純命令一個安排和告訴人民繼續下去，就可以為充滿敵意的國家爭論帶來永久的解決方案。任何法院想去公眾態度造成的影響，都一定要來自判詞的強度，而非意圖行使「赤裸的司法權力」。」（頁68-69）
·       “We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.” (Page 69)
·       「因此我們裁定憲法沒有賦予墮胎的權利。羅案及凱西案必須被推翻。為墮胎立法的權力必須交回給人民及他們的選舉代表。」（頁69）

·       “Precedents should be respected, but sometimes the Court errs, and occasionally the Court issues an important decision that is egregiously wrong. When that happens, stare decisis is not a straitjacket.”  (Page 70)  
「案例應該被尊重，但有時法院會犯錯，而偶爾法院宣判一個重要的判決時，是充滿驚人的錯誤。當這事發生時，遵循先例就不是一個緊箍咒。」（頁70）
·       “But we have stated unequivocally that “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Supra, at 66. We have also explained why that is so: rights regarding contraception and same-sex relationships are inherently different from the right to abortion because the latter (as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and Casey termed “potential life.”  (Page 71)  
「但我們已經毫不含糊地指出「這判詞不應被理解為質疑其他與墮胎無關的案例」我們也已經解釋為何如此：避孕及同性關係的權利本質上與墮胎權不同，因為後者（正如我們已強調）獨特地牽涉羅案及凱西案所講的「潛在生命」。」（頁71)

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